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During the last half of 1979, the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (hereinafter referred to as SEC) adopted three rules that, at least in
part, regulate tender offers by companies for their own securities, i e.,
"issuer tender offers."' These rules include Rule 13e-42 and related
Schedule 13E-4 which specifically regulate certain issuer tender offers;
Rule 13e-3, 3 which regulates "going private"4 transactions, including
1. For purposes of this article, the term "issuer tender offer" will refer to an announced offer
by a company to repurchase from its security holders all or a specified number of shares of a
security issued by it at a specified price or formula. The term includes both cash tender offers and
exchange offers. Although the federal securities laws do not define the term, a "tender offer" in its
traditional form is "a bid by an individual, group, or company to buy a specified number of shares
of a corporation's stock from the public at a specified price which is set above the going market
price in order to make the offer more attractive." Remarks of Senator Williams, 113 CONO. REC.
855 (1967).
Certain transactions not clearly encompassed within the above definition have been deemed to
constitute a tender offer. See, e.g., S-G Securities, Inc. v. Fuqua Inv. Co., [1979 Transfer Binder]
FED. Sec. L. REP. (CCH) 96,750 (S.D. Mass. 1978); Cattlemen's Inv. Co. v. Fears, 343 F. Supp,
1248 (W.D. Okla. 1972); E. ARANOw, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER
OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 1-34 (1977). In addition, the SEC has proposed for comment
a definition of "tender offer." See SEC Securities Act Release No. 6159 [1979-1980 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,374 (1979).
2. 17 C.F.R. §240.13e-4 (1980).
3. 17 C.F.R. §240.13e-3 (1980).
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transactions that involve issuer tender offers; and Rule 14e-1, 5 which
imposes certain requirements with respect to both issuer and third
party tender offers. Together, these rules impose a substantial regula-
tory framework upon a corporate activity which previously received
little attention. This article will analyze the provisions of the above
rules, and certain related proposed rules under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (hereinafter referred to as Exchange Act),6 relating to issuer
tender offers. The statutory authority for such regulation also will be
examined. First, a review of the history of Rule 13e-4 and a review of
previous regulations applicable to issuer tender offers will be under-
taken.
THE REGULATION OF ISSUER TENDER OFFERS: BACKGROUND
A. History of Rule 13e-4
During the 1960's purchases by corporations of their own securities
became a substantial market force. In 1954, companies listed on the
New York Stock Exchange repurchased only about 5.8 million shares
of their own stock.7 By 1965 the number of shares reacquired by such
companies had jumped to 37.2 million.' In early 1967 the staff of the
SEC, in response to this increased activity, submitted to certain mem-
bers of the business community a preliminary draft of a proposed rule
which was intended to provide comprehensive regulation of issuer re-
purchases.9 This proposed rule, designated as Rule lOb-10, would have
imposed various restrictions on issuers with respect to open market
purchases, private transactions not involving broker or dealer, and
tender offers. With respect to tender offers, proposed subsection (c)(4)
of Rule lOb-10 would have made it unlawful for any issuer to repur-
chase its stock pursuant to a tender offer unless certain provisions,
designed to assure fairness in the tender offer, were satisfied."
4. "Going private" literally refers to the attempt by a publicly-held company to return to
private status. For a discussion of the "going private" phenomenon, see Brudney & Chirelstein, A
Restatement-of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 YALE L.J. 1354, 1365-70. See generally Swanson, The
Elimination of Public Shareholders: Going Private, 7 CONN. REV. 609 (1975).
5. 17 C.F.R. §240.14e-I (1980).
6. 15 U.S.C. §§78a-78hh (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
7. Guthart, More Companies Are Buying Back Their Stock, HARV. Bus. REV., March-April
1965, at 40.
8. C. ELLIS & A. YOUNG, THE REPURCHASE OF COMMON STOCK 4 (1971). By 1973, the
amount of stock repurchases by companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange was 143.8
million shares. See generally NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, 1973 FACT BOOK.
9. See Hearings on S.510 Before the Subconlr. on Securities ofthe Senate Comm. on Banking
and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1967) (testimony of Manuel F. Cohen, then Chairman of
the SEC), [hereinafter cited as 1967 Senate Hearings].
10. Proposed subsection (c)(4) prohibited issuer tender offers unless:
A. the same offer is made to all holders of such security or to all holders of less than a
specified number of shares or units of such security;
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At approximately the same time, Congressional hearings were sched-
uled on S.510, the so-called "Williams Bill."" The primary purpose of
the Williams Bill was to regulate the use of tender offers to obtain con-
trol of a corporation and to provide disclosure of pertinent information
concerning persons seeking to obtain control of a corporation. 12 One
provision of the bill, however, granted the SEC rule-making authority
with respect to issuer's repurchases. In its original form, S.510 would
have authorized the SEC to adopt such rules and regulations with re-
spect to issuer repurchases as would be "necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors or in order to prevent
such acts and practices as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative." '
3
There had been no intention, however, to grant the SEC such broad
rule-making authority and the bill subsequently was amended to clar-
ify that rules and regulations could be adopted only to prevent acts and
practices that are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative.' 4 Conse-
B. the formula or basis on which the price to be paid for each share or unit, and the
number of shares or units to be purchased from each security held, is determined, is the
same for all holders of such security;
C. the procedures followed by the issuer in accepting securities tendered by security
holders do not afford any particular security holder any advantage over other holders of
the same security; and
D. no securities are purchased by the issuer, except in the manner provided in this
subparagraph (4), during the period beginning - days before any such tender offers
solicited, and ending ---. days after all purchases have been made pursuant thereto.
1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 9, at 215-16.
11. See 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 9. The bill was enacted in 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-
439, 82 Stat. 454 (July 29, 1968). The sections added to the Exchange Act by it-Sections 13(d),
13(e), 14(d), and 14(e)-are commonly referred to as the Williams Act.
12. See SENATE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, FULL DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE
EQUITY OWNERSHIPS AND IN CORPORATE TAKEOVER BIDS, S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
1(1967).
13. See 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 9, (emphasis added). Manuel F. Cohen, then
Chairman of the SEC, noted in his testimony on S. 510:
The provisions of this bill would make it unlawful for an issuer to purchase its own
securities in contravention of rules and regulations which the Commission adopts be-
cause they are necessary or appropriate of the public interest, or to protect investors,
irrespective of the question whether, or our ability to prove that, such activity is or may
be fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative. The language, for this reason, is broader in its
scope than presently applicable provisions of the Exchange Act.
1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 9, at 27.
14. HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE
EQUITY OWNERSHIP, H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1968), reads in pertinent part:
The third amendment was made by the subcommittee following consideration of the
original language of the subsection which was in the disjunctive and lent itself to the
possible though improbable interpretation that the Commission had authority to issue
rules or regulations regarding the corporate purchase of its own securities in the public
interest, or for the protection of investors, quite apart from whether designed solely to
prevent acts and practices that are fraudulent, deceptive, or [sic] manipulative. The re-
vised language makes it clear that such rules and regulations may be adopted only for
these purposes. It is not the intent that these rules and regulations be designed to prevent
the legitimate purchase by the issuer of its own securities for normal activities such as
acquisitions for distribution under a stock option, employees stock purchase, bonus, or
incentive plan.
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quently, Section 13(e)15 of the Exchange Act, makes it unlawful for an
issuer 16 "to purchase any equity security issued by it if such purchases
are in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission
...may adopt (a) to define acts and practices which are fraudulent,
deceptive or manipulative, and (b) to prescribe means reasonably
designed to prevent such acts and practices."' 7 The SEC did not obtain
the broader authority to regulate issuer repurchases that it had sought.
The Williams Bill was enacted on July 29, 1968.18 During the next
two years, the SEC substantially revised proposed Rule lOb-10, and
redesignated it as proposed Rule 13e-2. In 1970, the SEC formally pro-
posed the rule for comment.' 9 In its revised form, the tender offer pro-
visions had been deleted from the proposed rule apparently due to the
SEC's conclusion that additional time and consideration were required
to determine both the contents and timing of disclosures and the sub-
stantive conditions to govern issuer tender offers. This deletion re-
sulted in a gap in the proposed regulation of issuer repurchases which
was not remedied until Rule 13e-4 was proposed in December of 1977.
Rule 13e-4 and related Schedule 13E-4 were enacted on August 16,
1979.20
B. Prior Regulation of Issuer Tender Offers
Although there was no direct federal regulation of issuer tender of-
fers prior to the adoption of the rules discussed above,2' certain limited
restrictions are imposed by other provisions of the Exchange Act and
the rules thereunder, as well as by state law requirements. A brief
description of such provisions follows.
15. Provisions of the Exchange Act are referred to by section number while all SEC regula-
tions are referred to by Rule number.
16. In this context "issuer" refers solely to issuers subject to Section 13 of the Exchange Act,
that is, an issuer of stock which as a class of equity securities registered pursuant to Section 12 of
the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh (1976 & Supp. III 1979), or which is a closed-end invest-
ment company registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§80a-1-80b-22
(1976 & Supp. III 1979).
17. 15 U.S.C. §78m(e) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
18. Pub.-L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (July 29, 1968).
19. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 8930, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 77,837 (1970). A revised version of proposed Rule 13e-2 was proposed for comment in
1973, SEC Exchange Act Release No. 10539, [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
79,600 (1973), and again more recently in October 1980, SEC Exchange Act Release No. 6248,
[1980-1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,669 (1980).
20. Two weeks prior to the adoption of Rule 13e-4, the SEC adopted Rule 13e-3 and related
Schedule 13E-3 to regulate "going private" transactions (as defined in the rule) by public compa-
nies and their affiliates; the provisions of Rule 13e-3 are applicable to issuer tender offers which
involve going private. In addition, on November'29, 1979, the SEC announced the adoption of
new rules and a related schedule pertaining to tender offers. SEC Securities Act Release No. 6158
(November 29, 1979). Among the rules adopted was Rule 14e-l, which requires that all issuer and
third party tender offers, whether for securities of a public or private company, comply with cer-
tain substantive provisions.
21. See notes 7-20 and accompanying text supra.
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Rule lOb-6 prohibits an issuer, or other person on whose behalf a
distribution of securities is being made, from directly or indirectly bid-
ding for or purchasing any security which is the subject of such distri-
bution or any security of the same class or series. The rule also
precludes any right to purchase any such security, or any attempt to
induce any person to purchase such security or right, until after such
person has completed participation in the distribution.23  There is no
definition of "distribution" for purposes of Rule 1 Ob-6. The staff of the
SEC, however, has taken the view that "distribution" includes not only
an offering of substantial magnitude but also the presence of warrants,
certain options, or securities convertible into the security in question.24
Prior to the adoption of Rule 13e-4, issuers desiring to make a tender
offer for their securities were required to request an exemption from
Rule lOb-6 if warrants for or securities convertible into the securities to
be purchased were outstanding. Exemptions from Rule lOb-6 were
routinely granted by the Division of Market Regulation of the SEC
where these "technical' distributions existed," provided that certain
22. 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-6 (1980).
23. Id.
24. See, e.g., Letter from the Division of Market Regulation, SEC re: Ethyl Corporation,
Feb. 24, 1977, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,105 (1970) (the only
"distribution" of common stock in progress or pending was the outstanding preferred stock which
was convertible into common stock); letter from the Division of Market Regulation, SEC re: Cy-
clops Corporation, July 7, 1979 (the "distributions" were the presence of convertible securities and
employee stock plans). Despite the position of the SEC staff, it is highly unlikely that warrants,
options or convertible securities represent an ongoing distribution of the security they are exercisa-
ble for or convertible into unless there is a reasonable likelihood that conversions will occur dur-
ing the immediate future. In SEC Exchange Act Release No. 11766, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,316 (1975), the SEC enunciated what should constitute a "distribu-
tion" for purposes of Rule 1Ob-6:
Rule lOb-6, on the other hand, is designed to prevent manipulation in the markets. To
that end, it precludes a person from buying stock in the market when he is at the same
time participating in an offering of securities which is of such a nature as to give rise to a
temptation on the part of that person to purchase for manipulation purposes. The term
distribution in Rule lOb-6 should therefore be interpreted to identify situations where
that temptation may be present.
Unless there is a reasonable possibility that the proposed purchases could facilitate the conversion
of convertible securities or the exercise of outstanding warrants or options, a distribution should
not be considered to exist.
On March 13, 1980, Rule 1Ob-6 was amended to provide an exemption from the rule's proscrip-
tion with respect to tender offers subject to Rule 13e-4 or Section 14(d) if the only "distribution"
present is outstanding securities immediately convertible into, or exchangeable or exercisable for,
the target security. 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-6() (1980). At the same time, the SEC proposed for com-
ment an amendment to Rule lOb-6(e) which would explicitly except from the rule any distribution
of securities by an issuer to its employees pursuant to any employee plan. SEC Exchange Act
Release No. 16646, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 182,477 (1980). This
paragraph presently applies only to certain employee plans, although the staff has in practice
applied the exception to all such plans.
25. Between January 1, 1971 and December 31, 1979, the Division of Market Regulation
responded to approximately 450 requests for an exemption or no-action position under Rule 1Ob-6
to permit an issuer tender offer.




Rule lOb-13 prohibits a person making a tender offer for any equity
security from purchasing, directly or indirectly, such security (or a se-
curity immediately convertible into or exchangeable for such security)
other than pursuant to the tender offer, from the time the offer is pub-
licly announced or otherwise made known by the offeror to holders of
the subject security until the expiration of the offer.28 As a result, a
corporation cannot purchase its securities on the open market or by
privately negotiated purchases during its tender offer.29
As will be discussed later,3" the SEC has proposed to replace Rule
lOb-13 with Rule 14e-5.
3. Rule 10b-431
Rule lOb-4 prohibits the short tendering of securities pursuant to a
tender offer.32 This rule regulates the activity of security holders rather
than of the offeror. Prior to the adoption of the rule in 1968, there had
been an increasing practice, in connection with tender offers for fewer
than all of the outstanding shares of the class being sought, to tender or
26. The conditions generally imposed were: (1) appropriate notice of the offer was given to
all holders of the subject security; (2) the issuer complied with conditions substantially equivalent
to the withdrawl, pro rata and increased consideration provisions of Section 14(d)(5)-(7) of the
Exchange Act; and (3) no purchases of the subject security were made otherwise than pursuant to
the offer from the time the offer was announced until two weeks after its termination. For exam-
ple, see note 24 supra (letters re: Ethyl Corp. and Cyclops Corp.).
27. 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-13 (1980).
28. Rule lOb-13(a) declares in part:
No person who makes a cash tender offer or exchange offer for any equity security shall,
directly or indirectly, purchase, or make any arrangement to purchase, any such security
(or any other security which is immediately convertible into or exchangeable for such
security), otherwise than pursuant to such tender offer or exchange offer, from the time
such tender offer or exchange offer is publicly announced or otherwise made known by
such person to holders of the security to be acquired until the expiration of the period,
including any extensions thereof, during which securities tendered pursuant to such
tender offer or exchange offer may by the terms of such offer be accepted or rejected.
29. 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-13(c) (1980). Exemptions are provided, however, for the purchase of
a security pursuant to a stock option plan involving only "qualified stock options" or qualifying as
an "employee stock plan" as those terms are defined in Sections 422 and 423 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954, as amended, or "restricted stock options" as defined in Section 424(b)
thereof, or pursuant to a stock purchase plan providing for both (i) periodic payments (or payroll
deductions) for acquisition of securities by or on behalf of participating employees and (ii) peri-
odic purchases of securities by participating employees, where the persons acquiring the securities
do so for the account of such employees.
30. See text accompanying note 142 infra.
31. 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-4 (1980). An amendment to Rule lOb-4 was proposed for comment
in 1977, SEC Exchange Act Release No. 14157, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP.
(CHH) 81,363 (1977) to also deal with the problem of short sales, loans of subject securities for
purposes of facilitating such short sales, and guarantees of delivery. No action has been taken yet
with respect to this proposal.
32. "Short tendering" is the practice whereby a security holder tenders more shares pursuant
to a tender offer than he actually owns.
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guarantee the tender of more securities than were actually owned in
situations where prorationing was anticipated in order to have more of
the owned securities actually accepted. If, for example, only 50% of
tendered securities were accepted, a person who had tendered twice as
many securities as he or she owned would have all of his or her securi-
ties accepted.
4. Anti-Fraud Provisions
There are two principal anti-fraud provisions of the Exchange Act
which may be applicable to issuer tender offers: Sections 10(b)33 and
14(e).34  Rule lOb-5,35 adopted by the SEC under Section 10(b), is
probably the most used and best known rule or section of the entire
federal security law. Basically the rule proscribes any material misrep-
resentation or omission by a purchaser or a seller of securities.36 De-
spite the reference in Rule lOb-5 to fraudulent acts, the prohibitions of
Section 10(b), under which the rule was adopted, are limited to "any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance. 37 Consequently, a
cause of action can be stated under Rule lOb-5 "only if the conduct
alleged can be fairly viewed as 'manipulative or deceptive' within the
meaning of the statute."38 Despite this limitation, the rule clearly re-
quires an issuer to provide full and fair disclosure to those from whom
33. 15 U.S.C. §78j(b) (1976).
34. Id. §78n(e).
35. 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5 (1980).
36. Id. The rule provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any National
Securities Exchange,
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or any artifice to defraud,
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements make, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate
as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security.
37. 15 U.S.C. §786) (1976). Section 10 declares in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange-
(b) to use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors. (emphasis added).
38. Santa Fe Indus. Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473-74 (1977). Prior to the Supreme Court
decision in Santa Fe, a number of lower courts had held that the combination of a controlling
influence and unfairness could constitute a violation of Rule lOb-5 even if there was full disclo-
sure. See, e.g., Shell v. Hensley, 430 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1970); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d
215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969); Albright v. Bergendahl, 391 F.
Supp. 754 (D. Utah 1974). For an analysis of the impact of Santa Fe on "new fraud", see Jacobs,
How Santa FeAffects lOb-S"s Proscrotions Against Corfporate Mismanagement, 6 SEC. REG. L.J. 3
(1978).
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it repurchases its stock, whether by means of a tender offer or other-
wise. Nevertheless, there has been little litigation concerning this issue
outside of the context of "going private" transactions.39
Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act proscribes fraudulent, deceptive,
or manipulative acts or practices in connection with a tender offer. Un-
like Section 14(d), which regulates third party tender offers involving a
class of equity security registered pursuant to Section 12 of the Ex-
change Act and certain other equity securities, Section 14(e) applies to
all tender offers, whether by a third party or an issuer, and is limited
only by the jurisdictional limits of the Exchange Act itself.40 Moreover,
unlike Rule lOb-5, 4t private actions for damages under Section 14(e)
have not been limited to purchasers and sellers.42 This permits a secur-
ity holder whose securities were not accepted or to whom the offer was
not extended to bring an action under this section.
A potentially greater difference between Section 14(e) and Rule lOb-
5 is the fact that Section 14(e) specifically proscribes fraudulent as well
as manipulative and deceptive acts.43 Theoretically, the case law prior
to Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green' with respect to "new fraud" in-
volving unfairness, whether or not there is deception,45 could be ap-
plied to suits under Section 14(e). To date, however, this has not
generally been the case.46
5. State Regulation
In addition to the federal regulations discussed above, issuer tender
offers also are subject to various state regulations. All fifty states specif-
ically grant corporations the power to repurchase their securities,4 7 al-
39. "Tender offers by issuers . . . look like a fertile field for lOb-5, but so far they have
produced more discussion than litigation." 2 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELDS, SECURITIES
FRAUD & COMMODITIES FRAUD §6.4, at 127 (1979).
40. Letter from the Division of Corporation Finance, SEC re: Henry Hiede Incorporated,
[1972-1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 78,838, at 81,836 (May 1, 1972):
The provisions of Section 14(e), the antifraud portion of the Williams Act, are applicable
with respect to all tender offers, requests or invitations for tenders without regard to the
class or kind of security involved. The applicability of Section 14(e) is not restricted to
tender offers falling within the ambit of Section 14(d)(1) of the Act.
41. The Supreme Court has held that a private cause of action for damages under Rule 10b-5
can only be brought by a purchaser or seller of securities. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
42. See Smalwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 596 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
873 (1974). For a discussion of standing to sue under the Williams Act, see Pitt, Standing to Sue
Under the Williams Act After Chris-Craft: A Leaky Ship on Troubled Waters, 34 Bus. LAW. 117
(1978).
43. 15 U.S.C. §78n(e) (1976).
44. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
45. See note 38 supra.
46. See, e-g., Berman v. Gerber Products Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310, 1318 (W.D. Mich. 1978);
Marshel v. AFW Fabric Co., 441 F. Supp. 299, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). Neither of these cases dis-
cusses the language difference between Sections 10(b) and 14(e).
47. See, eg., CAL. CORP. CODE §207; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §160; MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT
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though such right generally is limited to situations in which the capital
of the corporation will not be impaired or which will not jeopardize the
corporation's ability to conduct business.4 8 Many states also have
tender offer statutes, but issuer tender offers generally are specifically
exempted from these provisions.
4 9
Several state courts have declared that under common law the direc-
tors, officers, and majority shareholders of a corporation have a fiduci-
ary duty to the other shareholders.50 Since issuer tender offers
generally do not involve coercion, however, issues of fiduciary obliga-
tions in this area generally will be limited to the propriety of the pur-
pose for the offer and the adequacy of the disclosure provided.
At least one state has adopted "going private" regulations which af-
fect certain issuer tender offers." In 1977, the Wisconsin Securities
Commissioner adopted regulations in that state with respect to transac-
tions which could cause delisting from a national securities exchange,
termination of authorization for quotation on NASDAQ, or termina-
tion or suspension of reporting requirements under either the Exchange
Act or Chapter 551 of the Wisconsin Statutes.52 The rule requires, in
the case of subject tender offers, that certain withdrawal and proration
rights be provided and that the terms be uniform for all holders. 3
ANN. §6 (197 1). In contrast, England historically did not permit corporations to repurchase their
securities. See Trevor v. Whitworth, 12 App. Cas. 409 (HL 1887).
48. California, for example, prohibits stock repurchases by an issuer unless either (a) the
amount of the issuer's retained earnings is sufficient to cover such repurchases, or (b) immediately
after the repurchase, (i) the assets of the issuer (exclusive of goodwill, capitalized research and
development expenses, and deferred charges) would be at least 1.25 times its liabilities (exclusive
of deferred taxes, deferred income and other deferred credits and (ii) the issuer's current assets
would equal or exceed its current liabilities (or, if the issuer's average earnings before income
taxes and interest expense for its past two fiscal years was less than its average interest expense for
such period, would be at least 1.25 times its current liabilities). CAL. CORP. CODE §500. In addi-
tion, an issuer may not repurchase any of its outstanding securities if the issuer "is, or as a result
thereof would be, likely to be unable to meet its liabilities (except those whose payment is other-
wise adequately provided for) as they mature." Id. §501.
49. For example, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §203(c)(3) (" 'Tender offer' does not mean:
a. An offer made by a corporation to purchase its own equity securities .. ") Id.
50. See, eg., Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592
(1969); Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. Sup. 1977); Tanzer v. International Gen.
Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977), on remand 402 A.2d 382 (Del. Ch. 1979); Berkowitz v.
Power/Mate Corp., 134 N.J. Super. 36, 342 A.2d 566 (1975). See also Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S.
295 (1939); Lebold v. Inland Steel Co., 125 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1942).
51. Wis. ADM. CODE §6.05, citedin BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 164,605, at 56,534 (1980).
52. See id.
53. Id. at 64,605(2)(c):
If the transaction includes a tender offer or request or invitation for tenders, such offeror
shall:
1. Permit tenders to be withdrawn at any time within 7 days and after 60 days from the
date of the offer,
2. Purchase on a pro rata basis those securities tendered within 10 days from the date of
the offer, if more valid tenders are received within that period than the offeror has agreed
to accept; and
3. Purchase on substantially identical terms for identical compensation from all validly
tendering security holders;...
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THE REGULATION OF ISSUER TENDER OFFERS: RULE 13e-4
4. Application
Rule 13e-4 is applicable to any issuer which has a class of equity
security registered pursuant to Section 12 of the Exchange Act, or
which is required to file periodic reports pursuant to Section 15(d) of
the Exchange Act, or which is a closed-end investment company regis-
tered under the Investment Company Act of 1940.14 Although Section
13(e)(1) does not apply to an issuer required to file periodic reports
under Section 15(d) of the Exchange Act, Rule 13e-4 was, however,
also adopted under Section 14(e), which gives the SEC rule-making
authority to regulate any tender offer." Section 15(d) applies to issuers
of a security for which a registration statement was filed under the Se-
curities Act of 193356 so long as there are at least 300 holders of record
of such security at the beginning of the fiscal year. In contrast, Section
12 only applies to issuers of a security registered on a national securities
exchange or which have (or had) assets exceeding one million dollars
and a class of equity security (other than an exempted security) held of
record by 500 or more persons.5 7 In adopting Rule 13e-4, the SEC
stated its belief that "tender offers by issuers subject to the require-
ments of Section 15(d) represent the same potential for abuse as other
issuer tender offers covered by the Rule ... 58
Rule 13e-4 also applies to an offer by an affiliate of an issuer for that
issuer's securities. 9 The authority for such inclusion is provided by
Section 13(e)(2)60 in recognition of the fact that purchases by these per-
54. 17 C.F.R. §240.13e-4(a)(l) (1980).
55. See note 40 supra.
56. 15 U.S.C. §§77a-77aa (1976).
57. Id. §781(b), (g)(1). Section 12 (g) requires an issuer with both one million dollars in assets
and 500 holders of record of a non-exempt equity security to register such security with the SEC;
in addition, any other equity security may be voluntarily registered pursuant to Section 12(g).
Once a security is registered pursuant to Section 12(g), such registration cannot be terminated
until such time as the issuer has fewer than 300 record holders of the equity security in question.
58. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 16112, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
82,182, at 82,209 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Adoptive Release]. All page references are to CCH.
59. 17 C.F.R. §240.13e-4(a)(2) (1980).
Although there is no definition of an "affiliate" under Rule 13e-4 (presumably due to an over-
sight), both Rule 13e-3 under the Exchange Act, and Rule 405 under the Securities Act of 1933
define "affiliate" as a person that directly, or indirectly through one or more intermediaries, con-
trols or is controlled by, or is under common control with, the issuer." 17 C.F.R. §§230.405,
240.13e-3(a)(l) (1980). Control is defined by Rule 405 as "the possession, direct or indirect, of the
power to direct or cause the direction of the management and policies of a person, whether
through the ownership of voting securities, by contract, or otherwise." 17 C.F.R. §230.405(0
(1980). The presence or absence of control is a factual determination and can be quite perilous.
For a general discussion of the issue of control, see Sommer, Who's "In Control"? 21 Bus. LAw.
559 (1966).
60. 15 U.S.C. §78m(e)(2) (1976). This section provides that "a purchase by or for the issuer
or any person controlling, controlled by, or under common control with the issuer or a purchase
subject to control of the issuer or any such person, shall be deemed to be a purchase by the issuer."
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sons raise the same potential for fraud, deceit, or manipulation as an
offer by the issuer itself.6
Paragraph (g)(4) of Rule 13e-4 exempts from the rule any tender of-
fer which is subject to Section 14(d).62 This provision excludes most
tender offers by affiliates from the rule, since the only affiliates not sub-
ject to Section 14(d) are affiliates of issuers subject to the reporting obli-
gations of Section 15(d). However, the fact that a tender offer by an
affiliate for the issuer's securities may be subject to Section 14(d) should
not excuse such offer from the more stringent requirements of Rule
13e-4.6 3 To the extent that such additional requirements reflect the
fiduciary obligation of the issuer to its shareholders, they should be
equally applicable to persons in a control relationship with the issuer.
64
. Fraud, Deception, and Man oulation
As written, Section 13(e)(1) apparently requires the SEC, in adopting
rules and regulations concerning issuer repurchases under that section,
to first define acts and practices which are fraudulent, deceptive, or ma-
nipulative before prescribing means reasonably designed to prevent
these acts and practices. 6 To meet this preliminary requirement, para-
graph (b)(1) of Rule 13e-4 defines certain fraudulent, manipulative, or
deceptive acts simply as fraud, manipulation, or deception. 66 Para-
61. 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 9, at 27-28.' Statement by Manuel F. Cohen, then
Chairman of the SEC:
We have found that purchases by a parent or a subsidiary of the issuer, or anyone else in
a control relationship with the issuer, or by a welfare or pension fund subject to the
influence of the issuer's management, give rise to similar problems ...
62. The exemption reflected the determination "that additional regulation of such tender of-
fers at this time by application of Rule 13e-4 is unnecessary." Adoptive Release, supra note 58 at
82,207.
63. Rule 13e-4, for example, imposes an initial withdrawal and prorationing period of ten
business days, compared to the seven and ten calendar day requirements, respectively, imposed by
Section 14(d). In addition, certain information required by Schedule 13E-4 is not required by
Schedule 14D-1. The SEC declared during the hearings on the Williams Bill that an issuer mak-
ing a tender offer for its securities "probably should disclose substantially more information with
respect to its own business and prospects than can reasonably be expected of a third party." Sup-
plemental Memorandum of the SEC with Respect to Certain Comments on S.5 10, 1967 Senate
Hearings, supra note 9, at 202. Ironically, such information has not been required by Schedule
13E-4 to any significant extent.
64. In reality, the provisions of the Williams Act and of the existing and proposed rules and
regulations thereunder relating to third party tender offers generally are at least as stringent as the
provisions of Rule 13e-4, and would continue to apply to a tender offer by an affiliate of an issuer.
65. 15 U.S.C. §78m(e)(1) (1976). Section 13(e)(1) declares in part:
It shall be unlawful for an issuer which has a class of equity securities registered pursu-
ant to Section 12 of this title, or which is a closed-end investment company registered
under the Investment Company Act of 1940, to purchase an equity security issued by it if
such purchase is in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission, in the
public interest or for the protection of investors, may adopt (A) to define acts and prac-
tices which are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative, and (B) to prescribe means rea-
sonably designed to prevent such acts and practices.
66. 17 C.F.R. §240.13e-4(b)(1) (1980) defines certain fraudulent, manipulative or deceptive
acts:
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graph (b)(2) then sets forth the requirements "reasonably designed" to
prevent the acts and practices "defined" in the paragraph (b)(l).67
Defining fraud or deceit as a fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative
act for purposes of Section 13(e) is hardly in compliance with the spirit,
and perhaps not even the letter, of that section. As originally proposed
by the SEC, Rule 13e-4 had defined specific situations with respect to
an issuer tender offer as being fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative.68
Regardless of whether the SEC's original definition is considered to be
adequate, the approach certainly was more in keeping with the intent
of Congress than the circular definition finally adopted by the SEC.
Unfortunately, the original approach was abandoned "to obviate con-
cern as to whether the Commission intended to introduce unfamiliar
concepts of fraud, deceit and manipulation .... ,,69 To avoid those
concerns, the SEC adopted a "definition" so meaningless as to jeopard-
ize the statutory basis for the rule. An alternative approach would be
to specifically define the fraudulent, manipulative, or deceptive acts or
practices which the rule was reasonably designed to prevent, either in a
preface thereto or as a separate release.
(i) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud any person;
(ii) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading; or
(iii) to engage in any act, practice or course of business which operates or would oper-
ate as a fraud or deceit upon any person.
This language is identical to that of Rule lOb-5. It is uncertain whether this means that Rule 13e-
4(b)(1) is intended to have the same scope as Rule lOb-5, as delineated by the United States
Supreme Court in Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
67. 17 C.F.R. §240.13e-4(b)(2) (1980) provides:
(a) As a means reasonably designed to prevent fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative
acts or practices in connection with any issuer tender offer, it shall be unlawful for an
issuer or an affiliate of such issuer to make an issuer tender offer unless:
(i) such issuer or affiliate complies with the requirements of paragraphs (c), (d),
(e) and (f) of this section; and
(ii) the issuer tender offer is not in violation of paragraph (b)(1) of this section.
Paragraph 4(c) indicates the material to be filed with the SEC; paragraph 4(d) sets forth the disclo-
sure obligations; paragraph 4(e) states the permissible methods of disseminating the offer; and
paragraph 4(f) enumerates substantive requirements concerning the structure of the offer.
68. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5886, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
81,383 (Dec. 8, 1977). As originally proposed by the SEC, Rule 13e-4 defined as fraudulent, de-
ceptive or manipulative any issuer tender offer:
(1) as to which adequate disclosure of the terms of the offer, its purpose and other
material information relevant to the offer has not been made;
(2) which unreasonably discriminates among holders of securities which are the subject
of the offers;
(3) which is of unduly short duration or unduly restricts the right of persons tendering
in response to the offer to withdraw their tendered securities;
(4) as to which the issuer unduly delays either the payment for securities tendered and
accepted or the return of securities not accepted; or
(5) which is employed by an issuer, directly or indirectly, for the purpose of creating or
sustaining false or misleading market prices for the securities which are the subject of the
offer.
69. .4doptive Release, supra note 58, at 82,208.
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 12
C. Disclosure
Prior to or as early as possible on the date the tender offer com-
mences, the issuer or affiliate making an offer subject to Rule 13e-4
must file with the SEC ten copies of Schedule 13E-4.70 Schedule 13E-4
requires specific information concerning among other things, the na-
ture of the tender offer, the issuer, the target security, the purpose of the
offer, recent transactions or arrangements in the target securities, cer-
tain contracts relating to the target securities, and persons compensated
to make solicitations or recommendations in connection with the
tender offer.71
In addition to filing Schedule 13E-4 with the SEC, the issuer or the
affiliate making the tender offer must provide a statement to the secur-
70. 17 C.F.R. §240.13e-4(c)(1) (1980).
71. Schedule 13E-4 requires the following information:
1. Information concerning the target security and the issuer.
2. The source and aggregate amount of funds or other consideration to be used for the
purchase of the maximum amount of securities being sought.
3. The purpose(s) of the tender offer, the proposed disposition of securities acquired, and any
plans or proposals which relate to or would result in (a) certain specified events (including the
acquisition or disposition of securities of the issuer by any person; any material change in the
business or structure of the issuer, or "going private").
4. A description of any transactions involving the target security effected during the past 40
business days by the person filing the Schedule or by any associate or subsidiary of such person.
5. A description of any contract, arrangement, understanding or relationship, relating directly
or indirectly to the tender offer, between the person filing the Schedule and any person with re-
spect to any securities of the issuer.
6. The identification of all persons employed, retaineld or to be compensated by or on behalf
of the offeror to make solicitations or recommendations in connection with the tender offer, and a
summary of the material terms of the agreement.
7. Financial information concerning the issuer, including, if material: (a) the audited financial
statements required to be filed with the issuer's most recent annual report on Form 10-K for the
last two fiscal years; (b) the unaudited balance sheets, comparative year-to-date income state-
ments, statements of changes in financial position, and related earnings per share amounts which
were required to be included in the issuer's most recent quarterly report on Form 10-Q; (c) ratio of
earnings to fixed charges for the two most recent fiscal years and the interim periods provided
above; and (d) book value per share as of the most recent fiscal year end and as of the date of the
latest interim balance sheet provided above. In addition, if material, pro forma data should be
provided disclosing the effect of the tender offer on each of the above.
8. Any other information material to a decision by a security holder as to whether to sell,
tender or hold securities being sought in the tender offer, including, but not limited to: (a) any
present or proposed contracts, arrangements, understandings or relationships between the issuer
and its executive officers, directors or affiliates not otherwise required to be disclosed; (b) any
applicable regulatory requirements which must be complied with or approvals which must be
obtained in connection with the tender offer, (c) the applicability of the margin requirements of
Section 7 of the Exchange Act and the regulations promulgated thereunder, and (d) any material
pending legal proceedings relating to the tender offer.
9. Copies of the following documents, which are to be filed as exhibits to Schedule 13E-4: (a)
the tender offer material; (b) any loan agreement referred to in Item 2 of the Schedule; (c) any
documents setting forth the terms of any contracts, arrangements, understanding or relationships
referred to in Items 5 or 8(a) of the Schedule; (d) any written legal opinion pertaining to the tax
consequences of the tender offer prepared at the request of and communicated to the offeror; (e)
any prospectus filed with the SEC in connection with a registration statement pertaining to securi-
ties to be offered in exchange for the target security; and (f) if any oral solicitation of security
holder is to be made by or on behalf of the offeror, any written instructions, forms or other mate-
rial furnished to the persons making the oral solicitation for their use, directly or indirectly, in
connection with the tender offer. See 17 C.F.R. §240.13e-101 (1980).
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ity holders.72 This statement must contain the information required by
Schedule 13E-4 or a fair and adequate summary thereof; the termina-
tion date of the offer and whether it may be extended; the specific dates
prior to which and after which tendered securities may be withdrawn
and, in the case of a tender offer for less than all of the outstanding
securities of a class, the exact dates of the period during which securi-
ties will be accepted on a pro rata basis and the manner in which secur-
ities will be accepted for payment and in which securities may be
withdrawn. Any material change in the above information must be
disclosed promptly.
7 3
If the tender offer is disseminated by means of a summary publica-
tion, the summary may disclose only: (a) the identity of the offer; (b)
the amount and class of securities being sought and the price being
offered; (c) the scheduled termination date of the offer and whether it
may be extended; (d) the applicable withdrawal and pro rata periods;
(e) a statement of the purpose of the offer; (f) instructions on how to
obtain a copy of the tender offer statement (at the expense of the of-
feror); and (g) a statement to the effect that the information contained
in the tender offer statement is incorporated by reference. The sum-
mary advertisement may not contain a transmittal letter for the tender
of securities.74
Within ten days after the termination of the issuer tender offer, an
amendment to Schedule 13E-4 must be filed reporting the results of the
tender offer.75
. Dissemination of the Offer
Rule 13e-4(e) requires that one of three specified methods be used to
disseminate the offer. The offer may be mailed to all shareholders of
record, published in one or more newspapers, or published in summary
form in one or more newspapers with a copy of the offer and letter of
transmittal promptly furnished upon request.76 The latter two methods
are only available in certain instances, as discussed below.
A tender offer subject to Rule 13e-4 always can be disseminated by
mailing the offer directly to the shareholders, and this method must be
used if the offer involves consideration other than cash.7 7 If this
method is employed, the offeror must mail the offering statement to
each shareholder of record on the most recent shareholder list of the
72. 17 C.F.R. §240.13e-4(d) (1980).
73. Id. §240.13e-4(d)(2).
74. Id. §240.13e-4(d)(3).
75. Id. §240.13e-101 General Instruction D.
76. Id. §240.13e-4(e).
77. Id.
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issuer. With respect to beneficial owners, the offeror must determine
the number of copies, furnish such copies, and reimburse nominees for
reasonable expenses incurred in forwarding the offering statements.
Unfortunately, the rule is silent as to when the inquiry concerning ben-
eficial ownership must be made. The inquiry should be made prior to
the commencement of the offer if beneficial owners are to be provided
an adequate opportunity to review the terms of the offer prior to its
expiration. If, however, such inquiry is made prior to the commence-
ment of the offer and no formal announcement of the offer has yet been
made, the brokers contacted could easily surmise the reason for the
inquiry and might acquire positions in the issuer's stock or suggest that
their customers do so. To avoid this problem, the offeror would have to
give public notice of the proposed offer no later than when the number
of beneficial owners was determined, presumably several days prior to
the offer. This, though, might tend to drive up the market price of the
target security, and possibly force the offeror to increase the considera-
tion offered.
Cash tender offers also may be disseminated either by publishing the
complete offer in one or more newspapers or by publishing a summary
in one or more newspapers and furnishing the actual offer and letter of
transmittal upon request. It is the obligation of the offeror to insure
that the newspaper or newspapers employed will provide adequate
publication of the offer or summary. The use of the summary publica-
tion is not permitted if the offer is subject to Rule 13e-3, 1 e., if the offer
reasonably could involve a "going private" transaction.7 1
As originally proposed, Rule 13e-4 did not limit the availability of
either the long form publication or short form publication in dissemi-
nating an offer. In the case of exchange offers, however, such proce-
dures would conflict with the requirements of the Securities Act of
1933, and so these procedures were limited to cash tender offers. 79
Unexplained by the SEC is why an issuer should be permitted under
any circumstances to make a tender offer for its securities without dis-
seminating the offer directly to its shareholders. Although alternative
means might be necessary in the case of an affiliate of an issuer subject
to the reporting requirements of Section 15(d) in the unlikely event that
the issuer is unwilling to provide such affiliate with its shareholder
list,"° no justification has been presented for allowing an issuer to use
78. With respect to the applicability of Rule 13e-3, see the text accompanying note 122 infra.
79. As a practical matter, it would be impossible to comply with the prospectus requirement
of Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, by means of a publication in a newspaper.
80. Rule 14d-5, 17 C.F.R. §240.14d-5 (1980), allows persons making a tender offer pursuant
to the Williams Act to either obtain a stockholder list or have the subject company distribute the
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such a clearly less efficient method of notifying its holders concerning
the offer. Indeed, it is questionable whether, prior to the adoption of
Rule 13e-4, any issuer ever made an offer to its shareholders other than
by a direct mailing. The importance of notifying all shareholders con-
cerning the tender offer outweighs whatever cost benefits might be
achieved by using newspaper publications in lieu of a direct mailing.
The rule consequently should be amended to require that the tender
offer materials be disseminated by means of a recent stockholder list
unless, in the unlikely case of an offer by an affiliate subject to the rule,
the issuer refuses to provide such stockholder list.
E. Substantive Regulation
The "heart" of Rule 13e-4 consists of the substantive requirements
and restrictions which it imposes. These provisions regulate the dura-
tion of the offer,8 withdrawal rights, 2 prorationing,83 increases in con-
sideration,14 payment for tendered securities,85 and purchases after the
termination of the offer.86 Each of these provisions will be considered
separately.
1. Duration of the Offer
The rule requires that subject tender offers remain open for at least
fifteen business days from the date of their commencement.87 The min-
imum tender offer period is intended to insure that all security holders
have a reasonable opportunity to consider the terms of and to partici-
pate in the offer.88 An offer which remains open for less than fifteen
business days might cause hasty decisions to be made as well as work to
the disadvantage of security holders distant from where the offer is
made.89
offer to its stockholders. This rule does not apply to securities of issuers subject to the reporting
requirements of Section 15d.






87. Id. §240.13e-4(f)(1). In contrast, Rule 14e-1 requires that subject tender offers remain
open for twenty business days. See note 127 and the accompanying text infra. The New York
Stock Exchange Company Manual requires that tender offers remain open for at least ten days,
although 30 days is recommended. N.Y.S.E. COMPANY MANUAL A-180 (1963).
88. Adoptive Release, supra note 58, at 82,208.
89. In 1973, for example, the Division of Corporation Finance received a complaint that a
tender offer by a third party was made in a manner disadvantaging shareholders outside of the
Midwest. The complaint alleged that the ten calendar days that the offer was open did not pro-
vide sufficient time for such shareholders to obtain the information necessary to make a decision.
The complaint was not acted upon because at that time no minimum tender offer period was
required by statute or rule. Letter from the Division of Corporation Finance, SEC re: Advanced
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In the release adopting Rule 13e-4, the SEC stated that it would pro-
pose an amendment to the rule which would require that a separate
minimum offering period be required following the date that notice of
a material change in the terms of the offer is disseminated to security
holders.9" Such a requirement would assure security holders the op-
portunity to review the amended offer.
One issue not discussed by the SEC when proposing or adopting
Rule 13e-4 is whether subject offers should be restricted to a certain
maximum length of duration. Considering the impact that a tender
offer can have upon the market for the subject security, such an offer
should not continue for an excessive period of time.9
2 Withdrawal Rights
Rule 13e-4 permits tendered securities to be withdrawn during the
first ten business days after the offer commences and, if not yet ac-
cepted for payment, after the expiration of forty business days from
such commencement. 92 The tendered securities can also be withdrawn
anytime during the first seven business days after the date another
tender offer for the same class of securities is first made if they have not
yet been accepted for payment.93 Such withdrawal rights provide
tendering security holders the opportunity to reconsider their decision
during the initial period of the offer or after a competing offer is made,
and assure that holders do not have their shares "locked in" for an
excessive period of time.94 During the interim period when withdrawal
rights are not applicable, however, the offeror still is provided with a
degree of certainty concerning the success of the offer and can extend,
terminate, or revise the offer accordingly.95
"The withdrawal rights provided by Rule 13e-4 for issuer tender offers
exceed those provided by the Williams Act for third party tender of-
Systems, Inc., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 79,653, at 82,208 (Nov. 15,
1973).
90. Adoptive Release, supra note 58, at 82,208 n.29. Such a period should be for a lesser
period of time since shareholders, once aware of the offer, would need less time to consider the
amended terms.
91. The right of tendering security holders to withdraw their securities forty business days
after the commencement of the offer, if such shares have not yet been accepted, will substantially
deter, though not absolutely prevent offers for a longer period. Until early 1974, the Division
frequently imposed a 60 day maximum offering period in granting an exemption under Rule lob-
6 for proposed issuer tender offers. See Letter from the Division of Market Regulation, SEC re:
Whittaker Corporation July 2, 1973.
92. 17 C.F.R. §240.13e-4(f)(2) (1980).
93. Id.
94. See Adoptive Release, supra note 58, at 82,209.
95. It was for this reason that the SEC's proposal in 1967 that the Williams Bill provide
unlimited withdrawal rights was rejected. See Memorandum to the Securities Subcommittee of
the Senate Banking and Currency Committee from Donald L. Calvin and Phillip L. West, Vice
Presidents, New York Stock Exchange, April 17, 1967, 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 9, at 92.
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fers.96 These greater withdrawal rights can be justified on the basis that
the issuer has a greater obligation to its security holders than does a
third party. In reality, though, the increased rights more probably re-
flect the experience accumulated since the Williams Act was adopted,
and eventually should be extended by the Congress to third party
tender offers.
The SEC has stated that it will propose an amendment to Rule 13e-4
which would require that an issuer afford additional withdrawal rights
following the date that the notice of a material change in the terms of
the tender offer is disseminated to security holders.97 Unless such
change is adverse or involves a change in the form of consideration
offered, it is unclear why a holder who already has tendered his or her
securities should receive additional withdrawal rights, particularly in
light of the fact that he or she will be entitled to any increased consider-
ation offered.98
3. Proratloning
Rule 13e-4(f)(3) requires that, if a greater number of securities is ten-
dered within a specified period of at least ten business days after the
offer commences, or after an increase in consideration is announced,
then the offeror will accept all such securities on a pro rata basis (disre-
garding fractional shares). This provision is patterned after Section
14(d)(6) of the Exchange Act,9 9 and is intended to assure that investors
are not pressured unnecessarily to make a hasty decision in order to
have their securities accepted and to provide security holders living far
away a reasonable opportunity to participate. The prorationing period
can be for more than ten days or for the entire period of the offer, so
long as such period is specified in the offer.
Twd exceptions to the prorationing requirements are permitted by
the rule. The use of either or both of such exceptions is at the election
of the offeror, provided notice of any variation is given in the offer.
96. Section 14(d)(5) allows the withdrawal of tendered securities during the first seven calen-
dar days of the offer and at any time after sixty calendar days. See 15 U.S.C. §78n(d)(5) (1976 &
Supp. 111 1979).
97. See Adoptive Release, supra note 58, at 82,209 n.3 1.
98. See note 109 and accompanying text infra. It is also conceivable, in the case of a compet-
ing third party tender offer, that the competing offeror would attempt to "force" some change in
the issuer's terms in order to allow the withdrawal of tendered securities.
99. Section 14(d)(6), 15 U.S.C. §78n(d)(6) (1976 & Supp. III 1979), was in turn patterned
after the New York Stock Exchange requirement that a period be provided of not less than ten
days during which tendered securities would be accepted on a pro rata basis. N.Y.S.E. COMPANY
MANUAL A-180 (1963). As originally proposed, the Williams Bill would have required that all
securities tendered during the offer be accepted on a pro rata basis. 1967 Senate Hearings, supra
note 9, at 12. Both Section 14(d)(6) and the N.Y.S.E. COMPANY MANUAL impose minimum
prorationing periods of at least ten calendar days, whereas Rule 13e-4 imposes a minimum period
of at least ten business days.
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The first exception allows the offeror to accept all securities tendered
by persons who own, beneficially or of record, not more than a speci-
fied number which is less than 100 shares of such security (Ie., "odd
lots") and who tender all their securities, before prorating securities
tendered by others.' l° This allows the issuer to fully eliminate such
small holdings, which tend to have relatively high shareholder serv-
icing costs.' 0 ' Generally, the acceptance of odd lots prior to proration-
ing will not have a significant effect upon the proportion of shares
accepted from other security holders, and whatever impact occurs is
likely to be offset by the benefit to the issuer and consequently to the
other holders. 0
The second exception allows the offeror to permit security holders
who tender all their securities to tender upon the condition that none be
accepted unless a specified number (including all) of such securities are
accepted.'0 3 If this alternative is provided, the offeror must first accept
all securities tendered by security holders who do not so elect. To the
extent that additional securities will be accepted by the offeror after all
unconditional tenders have been accepted in full, such conditional ten-
ders will be accepted by lot. If a tender selected by lot is too large to be
accepted in full, such tender is rejected and another one is selected by
lot. This procedure continues until no more securities will be accepted
by the offeror."°
This exception is intended to permit tendering security holders who
so desire to avoid potential adverse income tax consequences which
could result from a partial acceptance of their tendered securities.
Under the redemption provisions of Section 302 of the Internal Reve-
nue Code of 1954, as amended, the receipt of consideration by a share-
holder upon the sale or exchange of the voting stock of a company
owned by him or her to the company generally will be taxable as a
dividend, resulting in ordinary income to the stockholder under Section
100. In the case of a tender offer limited to odd lots, the exception permits the offeror to accept
tendered securities by lot if more securities are tendered than will be accepted. 17 C.F.R.
§240.13e-4(f)(3)(i) (1980). This procedure permits the elimination of odd lots without pressuring
holders to tender quickly.
101. See SEC Exchange Act Release No. 14234, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 981,380, 88,783 n.17 (Dec. 7, 1977); Young & Marshall, Controlling Shareholder Serv-
icing Costs, 49 HARV. Bus. REV. 71 (1971).
102. The Division of Market Regulation regularly has permitted issuers to accept all odd lots
tendered before accepting other securities tendered on a pro rata basis. See, e.g., letter from the
Division of Market Regulation, SEC re: Cyclops Corporation, July 7, 1979 (shares tendered by
holders of fewer than 100 shares who tender all their shares could be accepted in their entirety
without proration); letter from the Division of Market Regulation, SEC re: Miller-Wohl Com-
pany, Inc., July 23, 1975 (shares tendered by holders of 25 shares or less who tender all their
shares could be accepted without proration).
103. 17 C.F.R. §240.13e-4(f)(3) (1980).
104. Id.
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301. If, however, such sale or exchange terminates the stockholder's
entire interest in the company or results in a "substantially dispropor-
tionate"l° reduction in the stockholder's voting stock in the company,
the consideration paid is considered to be a distribution received by the
stockholder in exchange for the securities, and therefore is taxable as a
capital gain or loss.'° 6
While certainly a procedure should not be permitted which would
favor conditional tenders over unconditional tenders,'0 7 the rule as
adopted unfairly favors unconditional tenders by requiring that uncon-
ditional tenders be accepted in full before any conditional tenders be
accepted. There is no reason why, in the case of an over-subscription,
conditional tenders could not be accepted on the same pro rata basis as
if all tenders were unconditional. Any conditional tenders that speci-
fied a number that would be satisfied by the proposed prorationing also
would be accepted in their pro rata amount. The pro rata number of
shares which otherwise would have been accepted from the remaining
conditional securities would be used to form a "pool" of securities; the
remaining conditional tenders then would be selected by lot to have the
designated number of tendered securities accepted until the pool was
no longer sufficient to satisfy a remaining conditional tender. Any re-
maining securities in the pool could be disregarded by the offeror or
accepted as nearly as possible on a pro rata basis from unconditional
tenders, at the option of the offeror. Such a procedure, which provides
the greatest fairness to all tendering security holders regardless of
whether such tenders are conditional or unconditional, has been per-
105. Section 302(b)(2)(C) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides the following defini-
tion of a "substantially disproportionate" distribution:
(C) Definitions-For purposes of this paragraph, the distribution is substantially dis-
proportionate if-
(i) the ratio which the voting stock of the corporation owned by the shareholder
immediately after the redemption bears to all of the voting stock of the corpo-
ration at such time,
is less than 80 percent of-
(ii) the ratio which the voting stock of the corporation owned by the shareholder
immediately before the redemption bears to all of the voting stock of the cor-
poration at such time.
For purposes of this paragraph, no distribution shall be treated as substantially dispro-
portionate unless the shareholder's ownership of the common stock of the corporation
(whether voting or nonvoting) after and before redemption also meets the 80 percent
requirement of the preceding sentence. For purposes of the preceding sentence, if there
is more than one class of common stock, the determinations shall be made by reference
to fair market value.
106. For a general discussion (notwithstanding its title) of income tax aspects of issuer tender
offers, see Eustice, Going Private: Tender Offer Redemptionsfor Cash or Securities, 2 J. CORP. TAX
137 (1975).
107. For example, if the offeror were permitted to accept all tenders by lot in case of an over-
subscription in order that all accepted tenders would qualify for capital gains treatment, tendering
shareholders who did not care whether they received capital gains or ordinary income treatment
would be unfairly disadvantaged.
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mitted in the past by the Division of Market Regulation.108 There ap-
pears to be no justification for prohibiting this procedure, at least as an
alternative to the procedure specified in the rule.
The pro rata provision does not explicitly require that, where the
period of the tender offer by an issuer is extended, all securities ten-
dered prior to such extension must be accepted in full before any other
securities are accepted. Such a requirement is necessary to protect se-
curity holders who tendered during the original period of the offer,
from having the number of accepted securities diluted as a result of the
extension, and should be explicitly stated in the rule. 10 9
4. Increase in Consideration
Rule 13e-4(f)(4) requires that, if the consideration offered is in-
creased during the offer, such increased consideration will be paid to all
security holders whose tendered securities are accepted."t0 This provi-
sion is substantially identical to Section 14(d)(7) of the Exchange Act,
which was intended "to assure fair treatment of those persons who ten-
dered their shares at the beginning of the tendered period, and to as-
sure equality of treatment among all shareholders who tender their
shares."'tt Although the principle of such a "best price" provision has
been debated," t2 in practice there apparently has been little difficulty
with such a requirement.
In its present form, Rule 13e-4 does not require that all holders be
offered either the same consideration or substantially equal value. For
example, an issuer might offer a debt security in exchange for units of
500 shares tendered, and cash for other amounts of shares tendered. If
the debt securities offered had a significantly greater market value per
share tendered than the cash offered for other shares, the purpose of
this "best price" position would be circumvented. Although Rule 13e-4
is silent on this issue, Section 14(e) arguably could be interpreted to
108. See Letter from the Division of Market Regulation, SEC re: Standard-Pacific Corp.,
Sept. 13, 1974.
109. "I see no reason why those shareholders who have tendered during the initial period must
be left in a state of uncertainty while the offeror endeavors to attract more shares." 1967 Senate
Hearings, supra note 9, at 198 (testimony of Manuel Cohen, then Chairman of the SEC, with
respect to the prorationing provisions of the Williams Bill). If, however, an issuer announced at
the outset of the offer that, if prorationing was necessary, all securities tendered during the offer
and any extension thereof would be equally subject to prorationing, this also would appear to be
equitable.
110. 17 C.F.R. §240.13e-4(f)(4) (1980).
111. SENATE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, FULL DISCLOSURE Or CORPORATE EQ-
UITY OWNERSHIP AND IN CORPORATE TAKEOVER BIDS, S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 10
(1967).
112. See, e.g., 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 9, at 136 (Appendix to statement of Professor
Stanley A. Kaplan); E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 136
(1973).
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prohibit such a situation. Although there may be justification for offer-
ing consideration in different forms to holders of varying amounts of
securities, different consideration should be of substantially equal mar-
ket value unless all holders are given the option to elect either consider-
ation. As will be discussed subsequently, the SEC has proposed for
comment Rule 14e-4 which would require equal treatment of security
holders. "
3
5. Payment for Tendered Securities
Once the tender offer has terminated or has been withdrawn, the of-
feror is required "promptly" either to pay the consideration offered or
to return the tendered securities. 14 Although requiring the offeror to
act promptly is commendable, a specified maximum period of time
within which an offeror is required to act (such as 30 days) would avoid
confusion as to what constitutes "promptness."
6. Purchases After the Termination of the Offer
Until the expiration of at least ten business days after the termination
of the tender offer, neither the issuer nor any affiliate is permitted to
make any purchases, other than pursuant to the offer, of either the sub-
ject security, any security of the same class and series, or any right to
purchase any such securities.1 15 This provision extends the proscription
of Rule lOb-13. .6 for ten business days after the offer terminates. This
ten day "cooling ofi' period following the termination of the offer is
intended to allow all effects of the offer on the trading market to sub-
side before purchases which might prolong such effects are made by the
issuer or an affiliate." 7 Since desired purchases could be made prior to
or after the proscribed period, the provision should not constitute a
substantial hardship to the issuer and its affiliates."
8
113. See notes 136-141 and accompanying text infra. Offering less value for shares to some
shareholders than to other shareholders might constitute a manipulative or deceptive practice in
violation of the general anti-fraud proscription of Section 14(e). See text accompanying note 40
supra.
114. 17 C.F.R. §240.13e-4(f)(5) (1980).
115. Id. §240.13e-4(f)(6). In the case of an exchange offer, the issuer and its affiliates also are
prohibited during such period from purchasing the security being offered, any security of the same
class and series, or any right to purchase such securities. Id.
116. See text accompanying note 27 supra.
117. Purchases by an affiliate during this unsettled period would tend to have the same disrup-
tive effects as purchases by the issuer. A study by Barron's in 1975 of the impact of 51 third party
tender offers on the market price of the target secufity indicated that (1) the market price generally
increased sigificantly as a result of the offer, and (2) the market price generally declined after the
termination of the offer. BARRON'S, Dec. 8, 1975, at 70. The probable decline in market price
after an offer terminates would be temporarily delayed if significant market purchases were made
immediately after the offer.
118. The Division of Market Regulation imposed such a cooling period in granting exemp-
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7. To Whom the Offer Should Be Made (Not Adopted)
As originally proposed, Rule 13e-4 would have required that the of-
fer be made to all security holders of the class of securities subject to
the offer (with the exception that odd lot tender offers would be permit-
ted).119 Several commentators, however, argued that in certain limited
contexts there could be a legitimate business purpose for excluding cer-
tain security holders, 20 and the SEC concluded that further study of
this issue was required. This provision again was proposed for com-
ment on November 29, 1979 as part of proposed Rule 14e-4.12 1
OTHER NEW OR PROPOSED REGULATIONS
A. Rule 13e-3
Rule 13e-3 was adopted by the SEC on August 2, 1979 to regulate
going private transactions by public companies or their affiliates. The
rule applies to any purchase of or tender offer for an equity security by
the issuer or an affiliate, as well as to certain solicitations subject to
Regulation 14A and information statements pursuant to Regulation
14C. 2 2 The rule applies if the transaction is intended to or has a rea-
sonable likelihood of: (1) causing any class of equity securities of the
issuer, which is subject to Section 12(g) or Section 15(d) of the Ex-
change Act, to be held of record by less than 300 persons; 23 or (2)
causing any class of equity securities of the issuer which is either listed
on a national securities exchange or authorized to be quoted in an in-
ter-dealer quotation system of a registered national securities associa-
tion to be neither listed nor authorized to be quoted. Issuer tender
tions under Rule lOb-6. See Letter from the Division of Market Regulation, SEC re: Ethyl Cor-
poration, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,105 (Feb. 24, 1977).
119. The Division of Corporation Finance has interpreted the Williams Act as requiring that
tender offers by third parties be made to all holders of the subject security. It has declared, for
example:
Furthermore, Section 14(d) speaks of a tender offer for a "class of equity security," not a
class of equity security holders. Hence, a tender offer subject to Section 14(d) must be
made in a nondiscriminating fashion to all shareholders of the class.
Letter from the Division of Corporation Finance re: United Cable Television Corporation, April
8, 1975. See also SEC Securities Act Release No. 6159, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. Sec. L.
REP. (CCH) 82,374 (Nov. 29, 1979). Cf. Letter from the Division of Corporation Finance, SEC
re: Orange and Rockland Utilities, Inc., Nov. 22, 1976 (an odd lot tender offer by a third party
was permitted).
120. Adoptive Release, supra note 58, at 82,208.
121. SEC Securities Act Release No. 6159, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 82,374 (Nov. 29, 1979).
122. Rule 13e-3 applies to solicitations subject to Regulation 14A and information statements
subject to Regulation 14C in connection with a merger, consolidation, reclassification, recapitali-
zation, reorganization, reverse stock split, or similar transaction.
123. Once there are fewer than 300 holders of record of a class of equity securities subject to
Section 12(g) on 15(d) of the Exchange Act, the issuer's reporting obligations under the Exchange
Act (.e., its obligation to file annual reports on Form 10-K, quarterly reports on Form 10-Q, and
current reports on Form 8-K) will terminate.
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offers subject to Rule 13e-3 are required to disclose certain additional
information not required to be disclosed under Rule 13e-4.124 This ad-
ditional information furthers an unstated purpose of Rule 13e-3 of
helping public shareholders to determine whether the transaction ap-
pears fair and, if the transaction does not appear fair, to provide such




Rule 14e-1 was adopted by the SEC on November 29, 1979, and is
applicable to both issuer and third party tender offers. The rule applies
regardless of whether the subject security is publicly or privately held,
provided that interstate commerce, the mail, or other jurisdictional
means are employed. 126  The rule sets forth these four requirements:
(1) the tender offer must remain open for at least twenty business days;
(2) the tender offer must remain open for at least ten business days
from the date that notice is given of an increase in the consideration
offered or in the dealer's soliciting fee; (3) the offeror must either pay
the consideration offered or return the securities deposited promptly
after the termination or withdrawal of the offer; and (4) a press release
or other public announcement concerning any extension of the tender
offer must be given no later than 9:00 A.M. Eastern time on the next
124. Under Schedule 13E-3 such additional information includes: (1) a description of the
frequency and the amount of any dividends paid during the past two years with respect to the
subject class of securities and of any restriction on the issuer's present or future ability to pay such
dividends (Item 1(d)); (2) information concerning any underwritten public offering of the subject
securities for cash by the offeror during the past three years which was registered under the Securi-
ties Act or pursuant to Regulation A (Item l(e)); (3) information concerning any purchases of the
subject securities during the present fiscal year or the two fiscal years prior thereto (Item l(f)); (4)
if the offer is made by an affiliate, certain information concerning such affiliate (Item 2); (5) if the
offer is made by an affiliate, certain information concerning past contracts, transactions or negotia-
tions between such affiliate and either the issuer, other affiliates, or any unaffiliated person having
a direct interest in such matter (Item 3); (6) a description of the material terms of the tender offer
(Item 4); (7) a reasonably itemized statement of all expenses incurred or estimated to be incurred
in connection with the tender offer (Item 6(b)); (8) the reasons for the structure of the offer and for
undertaking the offer at that time (Item 7(c)); (9) the effects of the tender offer on the issuer, its
affiliates and unaffiliated security holders, including federal tax consequences (Item 7(d)); (10)
whether the offeror reasonably believes that the offer is fair or unfair to unaffiliated security hold-
ers, and reasonably detailed discussion of the material factors upon which such belief is based
(Item 8); (11) information concerning any reports, opinions or appraisals from an outside party
which are materially related to the tender offer (Item 9); (12) to the extent known, whether or not
any executive officer, director or affiliate of the issuer will tender his securities pursuant to the
offer and the reasons therefor, and whether any such person has made a recommendation in sup-
port of or opposed to the offer and the reasons therefor (Item 12); and (13) if the offer involves the
exchange of debt securities for equity securities, whether or not the offeror will take steps to pro-
vide or assure that such securities are or will be 'eligible for trading on any national securities
exchange or an automated inter-dealer quotation system (Item 13(c)). See 17 C.F.R. §240.13e-
1OOH (1980).
125. The SEC originally proposed that the rule require both procedural and substantive fair-
ness, but presumably realized that it lacked the authority to impose such requirements.
126. See note 37-40 supra. See also note 131 infra.
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business day after the scheduled expiration date. 27
The first two requirements do not apply to a tender offer by an issuer
for its own securities unless the offer is made in anticipation of or in
response to another person's tender offer for securities of the same
class. There is no explanation given by the SEC in the release an-
nouncing the adoption of the rule as to why issuer tender offers have
been excluded from these two provisions.' 2  Although Rule 13e-4 re-
quires that a subject tender offer remain open for at least fifteen busi-
ness days, there is no explicit requirement that a subject offer remain
open for a minimum amount of time after notice of an increase in the
consideration offered, 29 and in any event Rule 13e-4 only applies to a
tender offer for certain publicly traded equity securities. 30 The poten-
tial for abuse with respect to the period of time that a tender offer re-
mains open, either initially or upon the announcement of an increase in
consideration, exists as much in the excluded situations as in the case of
a third party tender offer for a privately held security.
Although the third requirement of Rule 14e-1 also is imposed by rule
13e-4, its repetition here extends the requirement to issuer tender offers
not covered by Rule 13e-4. The fourth requirement is new, and conse-
quently imposes an additional obligation on all issuer tender offers.
One serious issue raised by former SEC Commissioner Karmel is
whether Rule 14e-1 is overly broad.' While a strong argument might
be made that certain basic regulations should be imposed by the SEC
on tender offers by issuers or third parties for securities not otherwise
subject to Sections 13(e) or 14(d), extreme selectivity should be exer-
cised in determining the boundaries and the "basic" regulations to be
imposed.
C. Proposed Rule 14d-1(b)()
In addition to the rules adopted in 1979 which apply directly or indi-
rectly to issuer tender offers, three proposals were made by the SEC on
127. If the subject securities are registered on one or more national securities exchanges, the
notice of an extension must be given no later than the earliest opening time of any such exchange
on the first business day after the scheduled expiration date. 17 C.F.R. §240.14e-1 (1980).
128. SEC Securities Act Release No. 6158, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 82,373 (Nov. 29, 1979).
129. Adoptive Release, supra note 58, at 82,208, n.29.. The Commission indicated, in the Adop-
tive Release announcing the adoption of Rule 13e-4, that it would propose an amendment "in the
near future" which would require that the period of an issuer tender offer be extended after notice
of a material change in the terms of the offer. As of February 1981 no such proposal had yet been
published for comment.
130. See note 54 and accompanying text supra.
131. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 6158, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 82,373 n.8 (Nov. 29, 1979). "The exercise of the Commission's jurisdiction as fully as has
been done [in Rule 14e-2] is, in her judgment, doubtful." Id.
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November 29, 1979, which would significantly affect federal regulation
of issuer tender offers.132 These proposals deal with a definition of the
term "tender offer", a requirement that security holders be treated
equally, and a prohibition of purchases not made pursuant to the
tender offer.
Although it is beyond the scope of this article to discuss what, if any
provisions should be embodied in a rule defining the term "tender of-
fer",1 ' one possible shortcoming of proposed Rule 14d-l(b)(1) is par-
ticularly relevant to issuer tender offers and consequently should be
noted. As proposed, the definition apparently would not cover an offer
for less than 5% of the outstanding class of securities if the price offered
did not represent a premium in excess of the greater of 5% or $2.00
above the current market price.' 34 This could totally exclude certain
odd lot tender offers from the requirements of Rule 13e-4 and all other
federal tender offer requirements, since such offers frequently involve
less than 5% of the outstanding class of securities affected, and gener-
ally do not involve a premium of more than $2.00 per share.'35 The
132. SEC Securities Act Release No. 6159, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 82,374 (Nov. 24, 1979).
133. For a discussion of what does, or should, constitute a tender offer, see, e.g., E. ARANOW,
H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL I-
34 (1977); Note, The Developing Meaning of "Tender Offer" Under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1250 (1973). See note I supra.
134. The proposed definition is as follows:
(b) Definitions. . . In addition, for purposes of sections 14(d) and 14(e) of the Act and
Regulations 14D and 14E, the following definitions apply:
(1) The term "tender offer" includes a "request or invitation for tenders" and means
one or more offers to purchase or solicitations of offers to sell securities of a single class,
whether or not all or any portion of the securities sought are purchased, which
(i) during any 45-day period are directed to more than 10 persons and seek the ac-
quisition of more than 5% of the class of securities, except that offers by a broker (and its
customer) or by a dealer made on a national securities exchange at the then current
market or made in the over-the-counter market at the then current market shall be ex-
cluded if in connection with such offers neither the person making the offers nor such
broker or dealer solicits or arranges for the solicitation of any order to sell such securities
and such broker or dealer performs only the customary functions of a broker or dealer
and receives no more than the broker's usual and customary commission or dealer's
usual and customary mark-up; or
(ii) are not otherwise a tender offer under paragraph (b)(l)(i) of this section, but
which (A) are disseminated in a widespread manner, (B) provide for a price which repre-
sents a premium in excess of the greater of 5% of or $2 above the current market price
and (C) do not provide for a meaningful opportunity to negotiate the price and terms.
See SEC Securities Act Release No. 6159 [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. Sec. L. REP. (CCH)
82,374 (Nov. 29, 1979).
135. For example, Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corp. ("Kaiser") proposed to make a cash
tender offer to all holders of 25 or fewer shares of its common stock. See Letter from the Division
of Market Regulation, SEC re: Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corporation (Feb. 11, 1980).
Although the number of shares held by such persons represented less than two-tenths of one
percent of the total shares outstanding (approximately 80,000 shares out of 41,042,843), this repre-
sented approximately 8,000 persons. Since the price to be offered each holder was to be $1.00 per
share above the closing price of the stock on the last day prior to receipt of such holder's tendered
shares by Kaiser, this transaction would not constitute a "tender offer" under the proposed rule.
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staff of the SEC has attempted to provide a definition which includes
transactions which might not have all the earmarks of a "traditional"
tender offer but which tend to have the same effects. The SEC staff,
however, has failed to ascertain whether all traditional offers would fit
within the definition provided. The gap should be eliminated in any
future proposed or adopted definition of the term.
1 Proposed Rule 14e-4
Proposed Rule 14e-4 would require that the consideration paid to
any security holder be equal to the highest consideration offered to any
other security holder pursuant to the tender offer and that the offer be
open to all holders of the subject class of securities, subject to certain
exceptions in each instance. The proposed rule, like Rule 14e- 1, would
apply to all tender offers which employ jurisdictional means.136 The
"best price" provision would further the purpose of the "increased con-
sideration" requirement of Section 14(d)(7) and Rule 13e-4(f)(4) by ex-
plicitly prohibiting the initial offer of different considerations, which is
not prohibited by the present provisions. The proposed rule, however,
would allow tender offers by an issuer to employ a formula rather than
to specify a fixed consideration, so long as the same formula was em-
ployed with respect to all such holders. The reason for this exemption
goes back several years to a time when issuers, in making odd lot
tender offers, commonly believed that they were obligated under state
law to offer no more than the current market price for such securities
because the offer was not being made to all security holders. Conse-
quently, the staff of the SEC has granted exemptions under Rule lOb-6
to permit odd lot tender offers which stated that tendering shareholders
would receive the market price for their tendered securities on the day
such securities were received, or which employed some similar formula
under which the price paid to different shareholders might vary.
137
The requirement in proposed rule 14e-4 that a tender offer be open
to all holders of the subject securities would codify an interpretation of
the Williams Act that the staff of the SEC previously has made. 38 Al-
though the proposition that a tender offer should be open to all is virtu-
ally unassailable, the reality of varying "blue sky" and state takeover
laws makes this issue an extremely difficult one. The proposal does,
however, provide for two exceptions, both of which are limited to
136. Since these rules were adopted or proposed to be adopted under Section 14(e) and are not
otherwise limited in their scope, their application is coextensive with that section.
137. See Letter from the Division of Market Regulation, SEC re: The Fed-Mart Corporation
(June 15, 1973) (the price to be paid for tendered shares was the closing price on the American
Stock Exchange on the date such holder's certificates are received). See also note 135 supra.
138. See note 119 supra.
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tender offers by issuers. First, an offer by an issuer can be limited to
holders of odd lots. Second, an issuer can exclude its officers, directors,
and affiliates from the offer. The first exception is in recognition of the
legitimate reasons for odd lot tender offers.'39 The only justification for
the second exception, however, is that it "would operate to reduce the
proration risk to an issuer's public security holders and thus would per-
mit them to participate in the tender offer to a greater extent,"' 140 and
that such persons generally voluntarily will agree not to participate in
the tender offer.' 4' Regardless of what officers, directors, or affiliates
generally decide with respect to participating in a tender offer by the
issuer, there is no justification for allowing the issuer to exclude them
forcibly from the offer so long as the offer has not been structured im-
properly to "bail out" or otherwise improperly benefit such persons.
The relationship of such persons with the issuer does not, of itself, pro-
vide a meaningful reason for excluding them just so unaffiliated share-
holders will have more tendered securities accepted.
E. Proposed Rule 14e-5
Proposed Rule 14e-5 is basically a restatement of Rule lOb-13, ex-
cept that the prohibition of purchases during the tender offer would
extend through the first ten business days after the termination of the
offer.142 In addition, the proposed rule would apply to tender offers for
non-equity as well as equity securities and varies slightly from lOb-13
with respect to the type of public announcement that will trigger the
commencement of the proscription. The redesignation of Rule lOb-13
as Rule 14e-5 presumably is to place this tender offer provision with its
counterparts. .Considering the total disorder of the other tender offer
provisions, it seems inappropriate to waste time relocating Rule lOb-13
until a more thorough reorganization of the tender offer provisions can
be made.
STATUTORY AUTHORITY To ADOPT RULE 13e-4
The most crucial issue concerning Rule 13e-4, which ultimately will
require judicial determination, is whether the SEC has the statutory
authority to adopt the substantive provisions of this rule. Although
139. See note 101 supra.
140. [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,374, at 82,611 (1979).
141. Id.
142. See id. at 82,612. Whereas the proscription of Rule lOb-13 operates from the time the
tender offer is publicly announced or otherwise made known to the security holders, the proscrip-
tion of proposed Rule 14e-5 additionally would be triggered by a public announcement that a
tender offer might be made in the future. This provision would probably discourage announce-
ments of future tender offer intentions.
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Rule 13e-4 was adopted under seven different sections of the Exchange
Act, only Sections 13(e) and 14(e), are pertinent to this determina-
tion. 143 Both of these provisions were added to the Exchange Act in
1968 by the Williams Act.
A. Disclosure Requirements of Rule 13e-4
Before considering the statutory basis for the substantive provisions,
it should be emphasized that there is clear authority for the disclosure
requirements. Sections 13(e) and 14(e) both specifically authorize the
SEC to prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent deceptive acts.
It certainly would be deceptive to omit intentionally material infor-
mation relating to a tender offer, and the information required by
Rule 13e-4 would or reasonably could be material. Moreover, the fact
that Section 13(e)(1) authorizes the imposition of disclosure require-
ments, 144 further substantiates the unequivocal basis for adopting the
disclosure provisions of Rule 13e-4.
B. Substantive Provisions of Rule 13e-4
Determining whether the statutory authority of the SEC includes the
power to enact the substantive provisions of Rule 13e-4 is a far more
difficult question. Due to the explicit authority in Section 13(e)(1) with
respect to disclosure concerning issuer repurchases, certain commenta-
tors on proposed Rule 13e-4 suggested that Section 13(e) only author-
ized disclosure requirements. 14' Although the primary emphasis of the
143. The rule was adopted under Sections 3(b), 9(a)(6), 10(b), 13(e), 14(e), 15(c)(i) and 23(a)
of the Exchange Act. Adoptive Release, supra note 58, at 82,205 n.8. Section 3(b) empowers the
SEC to define undefined terms; Section 9(a)(6) prohibits transactions of a national securities ex-
change for the purpose of pegging, fixing or stabilizing the price of such security in contravention
of rules adopted by the SEC; Section 10(b) prohibits manipulative or deceptive acts in contraven-
tion of rules adopted by the SEC; Section 13(e) empowers the SEC to define acts and practices in
connection with issuer repurchases which are fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative, and prescribe
means reasonably designed to prevent such acts and practices; Section 14(e) prohibits material
misrepresentations and omissions and fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative acts or practices in
connection with any tender offer, and grants the SEC rulemaking authority with respect thereto;
Section 15(c)(1) prohibits broker-dealers from purchasing securities in the over-the-counter securi-
ties market by means of any manipulative, deceptive or other fraudulent device or contravention;
and Section 23(a) grants the SEC general rulemaking authority. Sections 13(e) and 14(e) clearly
are the primary statutory basis for the adoption of Rule 13e-4. The other sections, particularly
Section 10(b), provide additional authority for certain provisions of the rule, but do not authorize
any regulation of issuer tender offers not also authorized by these two sections.
144. Such rules and regulations may require such issuer to provide holders of equity se-
curities ofsuch class with such information relating to the reasons for such purchase, the
source of funds, the number of shares to be purchased, the price to be paid for such
securities, the method of purchase, and such additional information, as the Commission
deems necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors, or
which the Commission deems to be material to a determination whether such security
should be sold.
15 U.S.C. §78m(e)(1) (1976).
145. Adoptive Release, supra note 58, at 82,206.
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Williams Act, as indicated by its Congressional title, "Full Disclosure
of Corporate Equity Ownership and in Corporate Takeover Bids,"146 is
in the area of disclosure, this was noi its sole focus. The prorationing,
withdrawal, and increased consideration requirements of Section
14(d)(5)-(7) are one example of a requirement imposed by the Williams
Act which has nothing to do with disclosure. Similarly, Sections 13(e)
and 14(e) each specifically authorize the SEC to adopt rules reasonably
designed to proscribe manipulative, deceptive, or fraudulent acts and
practices. If Congress had intended that the SEC impose only disclo-
sure obligations pursuant to these provisions, the reference to "manipu-
lative" and "fraudulent" acts and practices would be not only
unnecessary but misleading.
What constitutes "deception" and "manipulation" has received sub-
stantial attention under the Exchange Act. "Deceptive" acts and prac-
tices involve the misstatement of a material fact or the failure to
disclose a material fact. Manipulative acts and practices are activities
intended to artificially affect market activity in order to mislead inves-
tors;' 47 the term is "virtually a term of art when used in connection
with securities markets,"' 48 and includes such practices as wash sales,
matched orders, and rigged prices. An argument can be made that
each substantive requirement of Rule 13e-4, even if directed at "fair-
ness", is reasonably related to preventing deception or fraud. Such an
argument might be presented as follows.
.1 Minimum Tender Offer Period.
The requirement that an offer remain open for at least fifteen busi-
ness days prevents an issuer from appearing to make a tender offer to
all security holders while in fact "bailing out" insiders or friendly par-
ties. A "bail out" or friendly redemption, employing the disguise of a
tender offer to all security holders, would be facilitated by a minimal
period of the offer in that (a) if the offer were for all shares tendered,
fewer shares probably would be tendered and the offer would be less
expensive, or (b) if, as is more likely, the offer was for a specified
number of shares, there would be a greater opportunity to avoid or at
least minimize prorationing. Such an activity, unless fully disclosed in
advance by the issuer (which is rather unlikely), would constitute a de-
ceptive act.'
49
146. 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 9, S. Rep. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
147. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977).
148. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976).
149. See SEC Exchange Act Release No. 8712, [1969 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP.
(CCH) 77,745 (1969).
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2 Withdrawal Rights and Prorationing
These two provisions combine to assure that security holders will not
be pressured into a hasty decision. Structuring the offer in such a way
that holders feel compelled to tender without studying the offering ma-
terial defeats the purpose of whatever disclosure is provided, and might
be viewed as itself deceptive or perhaps even manipulative. Moreover,
the absence of prorationing could be used in the case of tender offers
for a limited amount of securities. This would enable the'issuer to buy
out favored shareholders by properly structuring the offer. Adequate
disclosure in such instances would again be extremely unlikely.
3. Increased Consideration.:
The willingness of the issuer to increase the consideration being of-
fered, if necessary to obtain additional tenders, might be extremely ma-
terial to tendering security holders if they would not receive the
increased consideration for shares already tendered. Since it might be
difficult to ascertain whether the issuer had contemplated an increase in
the consideration offered prior to its actual occurrence, an alternative
means of preventing deception in this situation is to require that all
shareholders who have tendered securities receive the increased consid-
eration. This also prevents the possibility of "special arrangements" to
provide certain shareholders a greater consideration than that offered
generally under the disguise of a "late" decision to increase the consid-
eration offered.
4. Prompt Payment or Return of Tendered Securities.-
It is arguable that any undue delay in paying for or returning ten-
dered securities upon the termination of an issuer tender offer, unless
discussed in the original offering material, is deceptive in that there is a
strong inference that securities will be accepted or returned upon termi-
nation without undue delay. An undue delay in returning securities
might also be viewed as manipulative, since it effectively prevents such
securities from being sold until they are returned and thereby reduces
the float.
5. Purchases During the Offer or Within Ten Days After Its
Termination:
Purchases during the offer clearly have a manipulative potential, as
recognized when Rule lOb-13 was adopted. Purchases immediately af-
ter the offer terminates tend to delay the readjustment of the market,
and consequently also involve a potential for manipulative abuse.
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Both Section 13(e) and 14(e), unlike Section 10(b), specifically au-
thorize the proscription of "fraudulent" acts as well as "manipulative"
or "deceptive" acts. Was "fraud" intended to cover anything that was
not already deceptive or manipulative? The legislative history of the
Williams Act sheds no light on this question. Assuming, however, that
Congress was not attempting to be redundant and that the inclusion of
this term in Sections 13(e) and 14(e) when it was not included in Sec-
tion 10(b) has some significance, it is possible that this language per-
mits the SEC to adopt certain regulations designed to insure equitable
treatment. If so, this would further substantiate the statutory authority
for Rule 13e-4.
Since the rulemaking authority granted under Section 14(e) with re-
spect to tender offers is substantially the same as that granted under
Section 13(e) with respect to issuer repurchases of equity securities
listed under Section 12 of the Exchange Act, Rule 14e-1 presumably
will stand or fall with Rule 13e-4. Since Rule 13e-3 in its final form
only imposes disclosure obligations with respect to "going private"
transactions, its statutory basis should be far less uncertain.
CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding the particular criticisms leveled against certain as-
pects of Rule 13e-4, the rule as a whole represents a significant contri-
bution to the protection of investors. The various refinements and
modifications of the rule which have been suggested herein hopefully
will be considered by the SEC, but even in its present form the protec-
tions provided by Rule 13e-4 clearly outweigh its shortcomings. Rule
14e-1, although generally beneficial to the extent applicable to issuer
tender offers, inexplicably has excluded most issuer tender offers from
certain key requirements, and also raises serious issues as to how far
federal regulation of tender offers should extend. Both of these issues
concerning Rule 14e-1 should be carefully examined.
One potential difficulty not previously discussed is the burden of ful
compliance with Schedule 13E-4 in order to make an odd lot tender
offer. Considering the usefulness of such offers and their limited
nature, it would be worthwhile to exempt such offers from certain of
the disclosure obligations.
The predominant issue relating to Rule 13e-4 is the adequacy of stat-
utory basis for its substantive provisions. The primary source of such
authority is Section 13(e) and Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act, which
authorize the SEC to adopt rules and regulations reasonably designed
to prevent fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts and practices.
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The difficulty is that most of the substantive provisions adopted are
primarily intended to insure fairness (e.g., the withdrawal, proration-
ing, and increased consideration provisions of the rule). If "fraudu-
lent" acts and practices do not include the unfair structural provisions
of a tender offer, then the propriety of such provisions is dependent
upon the extent to which they reasonably prevent deception or manipu-
lation as well. Such an effect appears to be present overall. Since the
benefit of the substantive provisions is great and their burden on the
issuer is minimal, it is hoped that the rule will be given the benefit of
any doubts and that it will be held to be valid.
In its nascent form approximately fifteen years ago, Rule 13e-4 was
but one component of a comprehensive plan to regulate issuer repur-
chases. Now that this component has attained realization, the SEC has
once again "dusted off" proposed Rule 13e-2; its adoption will com-
plete the process.
